Abstract
This new government prioritised poverty reduction in its socio-economic policies but was much less inclined to change governance.
The paper begins by reflecting on the expected advantages of budget support and examining the possible contradictions in the underlying intervention theory. This leads to an outline of the methodology used for the evaluation of GBS in Nicaragua. The next section provides some background on the political economy of Nicaragua and on governance in the two periods in which GBS was provided. The paper then proceeds to assess the implementation of GBS in Nicaragua, and in particular whether this implementation was in line with the objectives ownership, harmonisation and predictability. The next two sections examine the results of the donor attempts to influence policies and governance and the other possible intermediate and final results of GBS. Section 7 concludes.
Expected advantages of budget support and methodology
General Budget Support (GBS) is a form of programme aid, along with balance of payments support and debt relief. Programme aid is aid that is not linked to specific project activities (OECD, 1991) . The idea of general budget support as the preferred aid modality has grown, first, out of growing disenchantment with the dominant aid modality, namely project aid. Project aid leads to high transaction costs for recipient governments, as each donor has its own disbursement conditions and its own implementation and reporting requirements. In addition, donors often set up their own project implementation units, poaching highly qualified staff away from local institutions.
Furthermore, project money is often highly unpredictable. All these practices undermine and weaken the country's own capacities for planning, budgeting and implementation of development projects. In addition, many of these donor-driven projects are not aligned with the country's own priorities and weaken domestic accountability. GBS would therefore contribute to a better coordination of development projects under the country's leadership, to lower transaction costs, more predictability of funding, and a strengthening of domestic capacities. It would ultimately also have political effects in the form of enhanced domestic accountability.
Secondly, general budget support is considered a response to disappointing effects of earlier practices of programme aid, in particular balance of payments support, in the 1980s and 1990s. This programme aid was accompanied by policy conditions, and research showed that these conditions were only implemented if they coincided with domestic political preferences and interests (Collier et al., 1997; Dollar and Svensson, 2000; Dijkstra, 2002) . This led to a plea for more selectivity: budget support should be targeted to countries with good policies and good governance. It was hoped that selectivity 'ex post', on proven levels of policies and governance, would reduce the need for conditionality 'ex ante' and bring about more 'ownership'. Ownership would lead to better implementation of policies, and thus to more effective poverty reduction. All in all, the advantages of GBS are based on two crucial elements: the non-earmarking of the money provided and country ownership.
However, country 'ownership' in the sense of the country having 'ownership of development efforts' cannot be taken for granted (Booth, 2011: 4) . Often the country's policies do not promote development. Many studies show that in order for a policy dialogue to have a chance of success, a minimum of preference alignment between donors and recipient is necessary. This can be guaranteed, to some extent, by the use of entry conditions. Most donors claim that they maintain strict entry conditions for GBS, including, for example, prudent macroeconomic policies, good governance, transparent and accountable public financial management systems, and a national development plan that prioritises poverty reduction. But in practice they have also started budget support if governments had (stated) intentions of improving policies, governance or public financial management or even if some of these conditions were not met at all. As a result, donors (begin to) use budget support to bring about the desired changes in policies and governance Some donors, for example the European Commission, are very explicit about this objective of budget support. For them, GBS is 'no blank cheque' but a means to guarantee that countries will 'stay on course' with respect to improvements in (democratic) governance and policies (European Commission, 2008 ). This may not only imply a return of 'ex ante' conditionality, but also means that GBS in fact has two objectives. One objective is to achieve more effective poverty reduction by providing freely spendable money that can be used in line with the country's own priorities, and the other is that of influencing the country's policies and governance. If countries do not sufficiently comply with donor conditions, a trade-off between the two objectives may appear. For example, if donors reduce disbursements in order to pressure the government to change policies or outcomes with respect to one objective, they will hamper the achievement of the other one.
The return of ex ante conditionality can also be expected to undermine other assumed advantages of GBS, especially if there is a large gap between preferences of donors and those of the recipient. First, the attempt to influence governance and policies will increase transaction costs, both for the donors and for the recipient government. In general, transaction costs exist precisely because donors want to secure spending and implementation in line with their preferences (Martens, 2008) . Second, if the criteria for compliance are not clear or if donors do not respond in a reliable way, sanctions may affect the predictability of budget support disbursements. Third, conditionality may hamper the hoped for more effective implementation of (donor-desired) policies. Fourth, donor opinions on what good governance, good policies, and good policy outcomes are, may vary. The World Bank, being constrained by its articles of agreement, is usually only concerned with the more technocratic aspects of governance, while bilateral donors and also the EU usually add a concern with democratic governance, demanding free elections and the protection of civil and human rights ( Leftwich, 1993; Doornbos, 2001) . Also among different bilateral donors, priorities within good governance and poverty reduction policies will vary. This will reduce donor harmonisation, both with respect to inputs for the policy dialogue and with respect to disbursement criteria. Fifth and finally, there is the risk that an extensive policy dialogue between donors and recipient government will weaken domestic accountability. Governments that succeed in pleasing the donors and consequently receive a lot of discretionary aid, are able to buy out, neglect or even suppress the domestic opposition (Whitfield, 2009 ).
These contradictions of the intervention theory must be taken into account when evaluating the results of GBS. The evaluation matrix (Table 1) shows the intervention theory for GBS, tracing the expected outputs, outcomes and impact that follow from the two GBS inputs, the money and the donor priorities for entry conditions and for the policy dialogue. The fact that there are two objectives for budget support implies that improved governance must also be included both at impact level. expanded. However, growth could not be maintained. This was partly due to policy inconsistencies and partly to a devastating civil war in which the US government financed the armed opposition (Leogrande, 1996) . The primary objective of the Bolaños government, as laid down in its National Development Plan, was economic growth. This was to be achieved by maintaining macroeconomic stability and by creating a more favourable climate for investment and in particular foreign investment. Ownership rights had to be better guaranteed, and state institutions had to be modernised. It was assumed that economic growth would automatically trickle down to the poor. However, the lack of support in Parliament and the earlier concluded Pacto between the FSLN and the PLC prevented many institutional changes from coming about. The Bolaños government was only able to change institutions over which it had direct control, such as public financial management. The Ortega government showed a willingness to maintain macroeconomic stability and to negotiate an agreement with the IMF, which was achieved in October 2007. It also appeared willing to maintain the improvements in public finance management. Moreover, the government gave a high priority to poverty reduction. It announced free education and health care services, and introduced special programmes for the poor, such as Hambre Cero and Usura Cero.
2 The aim of these programmes is to make the poor more productive. On the other hand, the government operated in a more secret way, and more power became concentrated in the hands of the president and his wife. The country began to receive large amounts of aid from Venezuela but these funds were managed in a nontransparent way, thus providing rumours that they were primarily used for party interests -in particular, securing re-election of President Ortega -rather than state interests. In June 2008, the government took away legal personality of two opposition parties, so that they would not be able to participate in the municipal elections of November that year. In the elections themselves, the leading party committed fraud in at least 33 and probably around 40 of the about 180 municipalities, including the capital Managua and the second largest city, León.
In 2003, Sweden and The Netherlands took the initiative for setting up a Budget Support Group, with the aim of establishing, together with the government, a harmonised system for general budget support. The expectation of higher aid effectiveness, in line with the official donor wisdom, was the most important motivation. In addition, at a general level donors had confidence in the Bolaños' government: its policy priorities (economic growth and macroeconomic stability) and its perceived willingness to fight corruptionevidenced from jailing predecessor Alemán -, to modernise the state and to improve the rule of law. Most members of the Budget Support Group were involved in technical assistance programmes for the improvement of public finance management, and they were confident that these efforts would be successful.
Design of GBS and harmonisation
After in August, the country's performance in year n would be assessed and within four weeks after that the donor commitments for year n+1 had to be confirmed in order to include them in the government budget.
The JFA defined some 'fundamental principles' that both donors and government had to abide with. They were formulated as:
'commitments to international law and conflict prevention, respect for human rights, democratic principles including free and fair elections, the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, free, transparent and democratic processes, accountability and the fight against corruption, sound macroeconomic policies and commitment to poverty reduction.' (Government of Nicaragua and donors, 2005: 5) .
In case of non compliance with these principles, disbursements could be withheld.
However, it was not very clear how this would be applied. Some of them, like an independent judiciary, were not fulfilled at the start, and several other principles were only weakly present, if at all. For none of them a minimum level was defined so that it was impossible for the government to know in which case disbursements would be at risk.
Donors and government also agreed on a Performance Assessment Matrix (PAM).
This PAM contained in total 160 policies, measures and indicators for a period of two years (2005) (2006) . Although the JFA specified a time schedule for the monitoring of the PAM and of the consequences, also in this case it was not clear how it was going to be used. In practice, all agencies had their own implicit priorities within the PAM and the fundamental principles. Some donors made their disbursement criteria explicit. The
World Bank continued to identify specific disbursement 'triggers' related to its Poverty
Reduction Support Credit. Both the EC and Switzerland applied a so-called split response mechanism: part of disbursements were linked to a general assessment of the PAM and the fundamental principles. Another part was linked to the degree of performance in specific indicators.
Alignment of preferences
It can be doubted whether the conditions for providing budget support were met in Nicaragua. First and as argued above, some of the 'fundamental principles' were not fulfilled at the start and others were only weakly present. The 'Pacto', supported by the majority in the National Assembly, prevented the coming into being of institutions related to liberal democracy like the rule of law and an independent judiciary. The donors expected that they would be able to use the leverage of budget support to support the Executive in its governance modernisation agenda, against an unwilling parliament and unwilling other state institutions. This can be considered optimistic and naïve.
A second problem was that at the start of the agreement, donors knew or could know that the Bolaños government was not much interested in poverty reduction, for example judging from the first version of the National Development Plan. Some donors agreed with the government that private sector growth would result automatically in poverty reduction, but most donors expected to address the government's lack of attention for poverty reduction in the policy dialogue accompanying budget support. However, it can be doubted whether budget support is relevant at all if donor and government preferences regarding poverty reduction are so divergent. to 109, but they were still largely donor-driven.
Under the Ortega government, both donors and government were willing to continue the GBS agreement. However, given that the FSLN was signatory to the Pacto, opinions about the fundamental principles now widely differed between the Executive and the donors. The JFA was maintained, but the new government managed to reduce the number of indicators and targets of the PAM and to bring them more in line with its own policy priorities.
Amounts and predictability
Appendix Table 1 shows that programme aid in general, and budget support in particular, In the period of the JFA, the European Commission was the largest budget support donor with a quarter of total resources provided. The World Bank and IDB also provided large amounts.
Appendix Table 1 
Influence
This section assesses the processes and channels used for exerting influence, and the results. The main channel for the policy dialogue were the bi-annual high level meetings between donors and government in which performance on the PAM was assessed. During these meetings, the government explained its performance and the donors were able to express their priorities within PAM and fundamental principles. During the first Annual Meeting in May 2005, when the ink of the JFA had barely dried, a first conflict appeared.
While 'macroeconomic stability as defined by the IMF' was part of the agreed PAM, the government did not comply with some requirements of the IMF programme. All macroeconomic targets were met, but the National Assembly had failed to approve some laws that the IMF considered necessary for medium-term macroeconomic stability, one of them being a pension system reform. In response, the donors decided to hold up their disbursements for about six months. The suspension of disbursements actually added leverage not only to the IMF, but in particular to the executive power vis-à-vis the National Assembly. Table 2 ).The rise in poverty expenditure thus preceded GBS and cannot be ascribed to the policy dialogue around GBS. Furthermore, the increase in poverty expenditure between 2002 and 2005 covered only 44 per cent of the resources released by debt relief in that period (Guimarães and Avendaño, 2011) . Social expenditure in per cent of GDP continued to increase in 2006, but especially in education a relatively large share of this went to tertiary education of which mainly the non-poor benefit (Moore and Soto, 2007) .
Health expenditure also proved to be badly targeted, with much more emphasis on curative care than on prevention (World Bank, 2007) . During the GBS policy dialogue, donors repeatedly requested figures on the regional breakdown of health expenditure in order to track resource flows to the poorest regions, but to no avail.
As a result of continuous donor pressure, budget execution has indeed been audited from 2007 onwards. This occurred with long delays and the audits (supposedly a constitutional task of the Supreme Audit Institution) required additional donor money.
More importantly, the Supreme Audit Institution is led by persons appointed according to the Pacto, so the actual results are limited. In addition, so far no follow-up has been given to the -limited -findings.
The approval of the Judicial Career Law in 2005 was clearly a result of donor influence. It implied that judges -at least, those below the highest level -were to be appointed according to merit. However, the government maintained that the law could not be implemented without 'regulations'. After three years of heavy donor pressure, the EU for example postponing its Judicial sector budget support programme, these regulations were approved in 2008. But even after this approval judges were still appointed 'retroactively'. Independent observers are of the view that no impartial justice exists in the country and that the law did not bring improvements.
All in all, there were some formal results of the influence attempts, but the extent of actual influence was limited. The donors were not able at all to exert influence on political topics such as free and fair elections and the importance of the CPCs.
Intermediate and final outcomes of GBS
The third evaluation question focuses on intermediate outcomes of GBS: has GBS been able to strengthen national systems, to reduce transaction costs, to strengthen domestic accountability and to increase government expenditure?
The preparations for the JFA and the policy dialogue around budget support brought an intensive schedule of meetings for both donors and government representatives, so transaction costs were high. All three types of transaction costs (information and search costs, negotiation costs, and monitoring and bonding costs) were probably higher and sometimes much higher than for projects. Yet, given that the amounts disbursed in GBS were much higher than those for an average project, GBS has contributed to a lowering of transaction costs.
donors provided GBS, the government's budgeting, planning and reporting systems improved. This was largely due to technical assistance programmes of donors, and was helped by a strong commitment of government officers. Yet, budget support gave the impulse for these technical assistance programmes. Under the Bolaños government, these government systems also became more transparent. This led to some improvements in domestic accountability: Parliament began to discuss not only budgets but also the actual use of resources, and civil society actively used the available information as well.
However, under President Ortega, and despite the adoption of a Public Access to Information Law in 2007, actual government transparency was greatly reduced.
With respect to the macroeconomic effects of GBS, there is no evidence that it led to reduced tax income, as this income steadily increased from 2002 onward (Appendix Table 2 
Impact on poverty reduction
The trends in poverty and social indicators broadly support the differences in policies over the years. Over the long term, from 1993 onwards, most social indicators improved.
However, in the period 2001-2006, the period of the Bolaños government, the picture is much less favourable. Progress on social indicators was limited, with small improvements in infant and child mortality and virtual stagnation in primary school enrolment rates (Appendix Table 3 
Conclusions
The expected advantages of General Budget Support are based on two features: the provision of freely spendable money and respect for ownership. Donors will only be prepared to respect ownership when there is a minimum degree of preference alignment, for example as a result of the application of entry conditions. In practice, entry conditions have not been very strict and donors use GBS to influence policies and governance in the recipient country. This paper has shown that the re-introduction of substantial conditionality may theoretically undermine several of the assumed advantages of GBS, including its final objective of more effective poverty reduction. In addition, there may be a trade-off between the poverty reduction and objective to improve governance. In both periods, donors put more efforts in influencing the government on governance issues than on poverty reduction policies. This is also revealed by the motives for (threats of) suspension of disbursements, which were always related to governance issues or. democratic principles. The attempts to influence had only limited results:
sometimes there was formal compliance but very little substantial compliance, and the attempts to influence political issues during the Ortega government were not successful. governance reasons, so they only briefly helped financing these more effective policies.
All in all, the paper shows that improving governance was a more important objective for most donors than poverty reduction, in both periods. The results on this objective were limited. 
